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 ABSTRACT 
 
 This paper investigates which different views have occurred on 
the main lines of the Dutch incomes policy. To this end the 
implications of the incomes policies pursued by different cabinets 
have been analyzed, mainly since 1973. It appears that distributive 
policies are heavily influenced by a paradigm shift. In the 1970s, the 
Dutch government replaced its keynesian oriented economic policy 
making with a neoclassical framework. As a result, the government 
not only moved from an interventionist approach in the 1970s to a 
restrained attitude in the 1980s and 1990s, but also altered the 
institutional framework of its distributive policies by abolishing a 
number of policy instruments that had been created to influence the 
size distribution of incomes. 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 Income formation and income distribution are closely 
interrelated. On the one hand, the income distribution is a by-
product of the more comprehensive economic process, i.e., the 
entire process of production and consumption. On the other hand, 
the income distribution results from a politically oriented process of 
redistribution. Government not only acts as a household in the 
market place, but also as a ruling body taking responsibility for the 
institutional framework within which economic subjects take 
decisions. 
 
 How far government' s influence goes, is essentially a political 
question. Thus, the answer depends on political norms and values. 
The cabinet-Den Uyl (1973-1977) stated for three reasons that 
government and the legislator bear final responsibility for an 
incomes policy. First, the government has specific duties with regard 
to certain groups. A large part of the income transfers results from 
this notion, in particular the part benefiting socio-economically 
vulnerable groups. Second, income distribution policy is an essential 
part of social and economic policies in general, deriving certain 
governmental responsibilities. Third, individual and household 
incomes determine to what extent individuals and households share 
in society' s welfare. 
 
 In a note on incomes policy, the Dutch Ministry for Social 
Affairs elaborated the basis and principles of the incomes policy to 
be pursued. i Initially, the main lines set out by the (center-left) 
cabinet-Den Uyl (1973-1977) did not seem particularly 
controversial, since its successor - the (center-right) cabinet-Van Agt 
I (1977-1981) - endorsed these main lines. At the end of its term, 
however, this conclusion seemed premature. In an evaluation of the 
incomes policy pursued in the 1980s, the minister for Social Affairs 
presented policy principles that in his view deviated from those 
adopted in the 1970s. ii 
 
 This paper investigates to what extent different views have 
occurred on the main lines of the Dutch incomes policy, taking the 
existing economic system as a given. To this end the implications of 
the incomes policies pursued by different cabinets have been 
analyzed, the main focus being the period from 1973. The remainder 
of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with different 
income distributions that can be discerned and the policies pertaining 
to these distributions. Section 3 identifies the instruments of 
distributive policies and touches upon two of them. In addition, it 
analyses the use of the two main policy instruments: pay policy and 
redistribution policy, respectively. In section 4 the main policy 
implications are discussed, while section 5 summarizes the main 
conclusion. 
 
 
 INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS AND POLICIES 
 
 Several income distributions can be discerned: the functional 
income distribution, the categorical income distribution, and the 
personal income distribution. The functional income distribution 
pertains to factor pricing. Therefore, it forms part of the price 
theory. Despite serious criticisms, iii the (neoclassical) marginal 
productivity theory has maintained its important position in 
economic theory, particularly in the theory of factor prices. Though 
after World War II the keynesian approach dominated the Dutch 
political scene, the orientation of policy makers gradually shifted in 
the 1970s. By the end of the decade policy makers appeared to have 
adopted the neoclassical equilibrium school of thought. 
 
 Since then Dutch policies have been dominated by neoclassical 
reasoning, though primarily in macroeconomic policy. As a result, a 
wage moderation policy was adopted which aims at wage rises that 
lag behind those in neighboring countries. This wage moderation 
policy was inspired by considerations of employment policy. To a 
lesser extent the neoclassical line of thought also affected distributive 
policies, for example because policy makers began to stress the 
allocative function of income differentials, though without affecting 
the basically egalitarian nature of the Dutch society. 
 
 The categorical income distribution pertains to the shares of the 
different factors of production in GDP, such as the wage share, the 
profit share, etc. In the Netherlands, the so-called labor income 
share is frequently used as a measure for the categorical income 
distribution. It represents the share of labor in the value added 
produced in the market sector including an imputed labor income of 
the self-employed. iv After World War II, the labor income share was 
at a considerably higher level than in the pre-war period, as Table 1 
displays. In particular in the 1960s and 1970s it increased 
structurally and its complement - the share of other incomes - 
consequently decreased. This is notable, since the production 
simultaneously has become more capital intensive in the sense that 
the quantity of capital per unit of labor has increased. 
 
 
 
 TABLE 1 
 Labor Income Share (LIS) in the 
 Market Sector in the Netherlands, 1930-1998  
 
 1930 1938 1948 1958 1968 1978 1988 1998 
  
 
LIS 67 67 81 73 77 79 84 80a  
 
a. Estimate 
 
Source: Central Planning Bureau, The Hague.  
 
 In Dutch distributive policy, the categorical income distribution 
has never gained a prominent position. Government did pay 
attention to it, however, in the framework of its employment policy. 
In the first and second stages of the post-war wage policy (1945-
1958) the categorical income distribution explicitly played a certain 
role, but later on it occurred implicitly at most. Particularly after 
policy makers had accepted the (neoclassical) vintage approachv 
more attention has been paid to the development of the labor income 
share. However, this has never led to the explicit formulation of a 
policy goal in terms of this share. 
 
 The third distribution to be discerned is the personal income 
distribution. Generally, the theoretical state of affairs with regard to 
this distribution is considered unsatisfactory. The shortcomings in 
theoretical insights is not the consequence of a lack of theories - the 
number of theories pertaining to the personal income distribution is 
actually quite large - but rather the consequence of the fact that 
neither of the available theories is considered to be satisfactory. 
Stochastic theoriesvi and the human capital theoryvii are in a sense 
extremes that are situated at opposite ends of the spectrum. Chance 
and luck play the leading part in stochastic theories, whereas the 
human capital theory leaves no room for chance and luck at all.  
 
 Of the theories trying to explain the personal income 
distribution, Tinbergen' s theory seems the most complete, since this 
theory explicitly comprises both supply and demand.viii  In this 
theory education plays a significant role in explaining the personal 
income distribution. This is supported by empirical evidence in 
many countries, though the size of the schooling premium varies 
across countries, by educational attainment and over time (also 
within countries). ix Table 2 illustrates that the strong relationship 
between education and income also occurs in the Netherlands. 
 
 Because of the increased wage share the income distribution 
over wage earners has grown in importance. In addition, factors 
such as experience and on-the-job-training have increasingly been 
contributing to the heterogeneity of the production factor labor. As a 
result, the labor class has become extremely heterogeneous. In 
combination with the increased wage share in GDP this has led to a 
situation in which the stratification within the group of wage earners 
is actually more important than the ricardian division in three socio-
economic categories (laborers, capitalists and landlords) both from 
the sociological point of view and from the perspective of the 
personal income distribution. Relevant is now the distinction 
according to educational and wage levels, which are closely 
interconnected. 
 
 
 
 TABLE 2 
 Ratios of Average Gross Monthly Wages of 
 Full Time Employees in Production and Service 
 Sectors According to Age and Educational Level  
 
Age Year Education  
 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary 
  
 
23-34 1979 100 120 182 
 1985 100 113 164 
 1989 100 108 152 
45-64 1979 100 159 229 
 1985 100 155 199 
 1989 100 146 231  
 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, The Hague.  
 
 
 
 Traditionally, Dutch public policy pays much attention to the 
personal income distribution. However, an analysis of policy 
documentsx shows that policy makers have always confined 
themselves to presenting descriptions of the existing income 
distribution or to a judgment of income differentials in qualitative 
terms. They have never formulated a clear-cut, quantitative goal, for 
instance in terms of some inequality measure or certain income 
ratios. Rather, policy makers have limited themselves to a vague and 
qualitative distributive goal - such as an ` acceptable'  or ` reasonable'  
income distribution - without providing concrete and testable details. 
Contrary to economists, Dutch policy makers do not use the term 
optimal income distribution. 
 
 
 POLICIES AS TO INCOME SOURCES 
 
 The main instruments of the incomes policy are the sources 
policy, the pay policy, and the redistribution policy. The income 
sources policy pertains to income generating characteristics that can 
be influenced. Therefore, it is the most fundamental instrument. It 
affects the income distribution in the long run and potentially 
structurally. Labor is the far most important source of income. The 
policy with regard to pay for labor is dealt with under the heading 
pay policy, which is followed by a subsection addressing the 
redistribution policy. But first I will briefly touch upon the sources 
policy. 
 
 
Sources Policy 
 
 The Dutch wealth policy does not aim at spreading existing 
wealth, rather it aims at the spread building up of new fortunes. In 
the framework of this policy measures have been taken to foster 
savings. The wealth policy pursued in the Netherlands does not seem 
to have been motivated all too consistently, which may be explicable 
from the fact that it has always been a politically highly controversial 
subject. In the 1970s, an arrangement for capital growth sharing was 
proposed. Both the collective element and the legal obligation in the 
proposed arrangement led to conflicts within the ruling coalitions. 
However, the deteriorating employment situation in the early 1980s 
led to a higher priority for an employment policy. As a result, the 
subject of the (collective) capital growth sharing arrangement faded 
away and political attention shifted to profit sharing and employees'  
savings arrangements, which are freely negotiated and agreed upon 
by employers and employees. 
 
 As to the income source of power the competition policy is 
relevant. In the Netherlands, abuse of economic power is combatted 
by a competition policy, which has been strengthened in the 1980s 
along two tracks.xi First, through general bans on horizontal price 
arrangements, market sharing and procurement arrangements, and 
an amendment of the Act on Economic Competition aiming at 
reinforcing the law' s effectiveness. Because of the general bans the 
abuse system has de facto already been changed into a prohibition 
system. The second track along which the competition policy is to be 
strengthened, is the bill New Rules on Economic Competition 
entailing a complete revision of the Act on Economic Competition 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1996).xii The new rules are based on 
a prohibition system - also de jure - and are linked on to the 
competition rules of the European Union. This development suits the 
altered theoretical framework of economic policy making, since it 
shifts the emphasis from government intervention to the operation of 
markets and the price mechanism. 
 
 
 
Pay Policy 
 
 Certain laws enable the government to directly affect specific 
dimensions of the pay of large groups participating in the production 
process. A pay policy pertaining to self-employed hardly exists, but 
the wage policy pursued from 1945 implies that wage determination 
has never been completely free. Government has always played a 
certain role, either directly by actively influencing wage 
determination or indirectly by the threat of government intervention. 
In 1983, however, the government altered its attitude radically by 
adopting the view that government should act more restrained and 
should thus break with the tradition of frequent interference in 
income formation in the market sector. 
 
 As a result, the institutional framework has been altered, for 
example by an amendment of the Wage Determination Act in 1986. 
This amendment curtailed government' s competency to intervene in 
wage determination by dictating that any interference had to be 
general (as opposed to specific) in character. Two causes can be 
identified for this development: market forces and international 
treaties. The first cause refers to the increased unemployment rate, 
which in itself already fostered a moderated wage development. This 
removed the need for government to fight or discourage buoyant 
wage hikes. The second cause refers to the continuous criticism of 
the International Labour Office (ILO) as a response to repeatedly 
deposited complaints of trade unions and employers'  organizations 
pertaining to a lack of freedom to negotiate because of government 
intervention in wage determination.xiii 
 
 With respect to public sector workers a so-called trend policy 
has been pursued in the 1970s, implying that public sector wage 
adjustments were in line with private sector wage developments. In 
the 1980s, however, this policy has gradually been replaced with a 
more autonomous policy, implying that public sector wage 
adjustments depend on budgetary possibilities. Moreover, centralized 
wage bargaining has been replaced in 1993 with the so-called sector 
model, which essentially means decentralization of wage bargaining 
over eight subsectors. Only the terms concerning pensions, disability 
benefits, and early retirement remain subjects for bargaining on the 
central level. This development can be characterized as 
` normalization'  of labor relations in the public sector.  
 
 In the subsidized sectors the government not only acts as 
employer, but also as financier. Expenditure in these sectors are 
publicly funded, i.e., they are for government' s and/or social 
insurance funds'  accounts. Since the government is responsible for 
the use of public money, this is considered to be a reason for 
government interference with the terms of employment in the 
subsidized sectors. As of 1980 the Temporary Act Terms of 
Employment in the Public Sector granted the government the 
competency to interfere directly with the terms of employment in the 
subsidized sectors. Developments in the market sector 
(decentralization of wage determination) and criticisms of the ILO 
about a lack of bargaining freedom in the subsidized sectors, 
contributed to the replacement of the temporary act with the Act 
Terms of Employment in the Subsidized Sectors, which was an 
intermediate step toward normalization of labor relations in the 
subsidized sectors. However, the ILO continued to criticize the 
situation of wage determination in the subsidized sectors - 
particularly the possibility to freeze the terms of employment - while 
the Social Economic Councilxiv advised to repeal the Act Terms of 
Employment in the Subsidized Sectors. As a result, the act has been 
repealed as of January 1, 1995, thereby taking another step on the 
road toward normalized labor relations in the public sector.  
 
 In 1978, the enactment of the temporary Act on Wages not 
Based on Collective Agreements enabled the government to interfere 
with terms of employment that are not determined by collective 
agreements. When this act expired by December 31, 1983 the 
government anticipated the planned amendment of the Wage 
Determination Act of 1986. Though the Act on Wages not Based on 
Collective Agreements was prolonged until January 1, 1987, the 
government did not avail itself of the competencies granted by this 
act. Since in 1984 and 1985 no extreme deviations in terms of 
employment occurred in the non-collectively determined wages 
compared to collectively determined wages, the government 
concluded that legislation in this field was no longer necessary. 
Thus, the temporary act has not been prolonged nor converted into 
structural legislation. Obviously, the government has retreated with 
regard to the non-collectively determined wages. 
 
 Since the early 1970s the government aimed at regulating the 
incomes of the professions.xv Initially, it did so in the framework of 
the Act on Prices, but decision by a judge made this impossible. The 
government responded by creating the Temporary Act Regulation of 
Professional Incomes. Practice shows, however, that this has only 
affected the medical sector.xvi In 1985, the Social Economic 
Councilxvii advised not to prolong this act, but rather to pursue a 
competition or sources policy to tackle the market imperfections 
causing too high incomes. The government did not follow this 
advice, rather it elected to create the Act on Professional Incomes. 
However, this act halted between two opinions.xviii On the one hand, 
the government wanted to retreat and to give room to market forces. 
On the other hand, the government wanted to interfere to fight 
undesirable effects resulting from an unequal division of power. 
With regard to the Act on Professional Incomes the same conclusion 
holds as to the Temporary Act Regulation of Professional Incomes. 
The act primarily served as a symbolic expression of a government 
aiming at controlling all incomes. Thus, it reflected the ideological 
climate dominating the political scene until the late 1970s and 
preceding the ideology of deregulation and a retreating government 
that came up in the 1980s. 
 
 
Redistribution Policy 
 
 An important instrument of redistribution policy is the tax 
policy. This appears to be subject to fluctuations. During some 
periods the egalitarian effect of the tax policy has been reinforced, 
whereas in other periods it has been weakened. In the long run, 
however, taxes - in particular the income tax - have contributed to a 
considerable extent to the equalization of incomes. Table 3 shows 
that the effect of social security contributions is slightly progressive 
as to the lower tail of the income distribution, but regressive with 
regard to the higher tail of the income distribution. Obviously, the 
progressivity of the income tax outweighs the regressivity of social 
security contributions. As a result, the overall effect of taxation is 
progressive. 
 
 Measured by the variation-coefficient and the Theil-coefficient, 
the income tax results in a reduction of the income inequality in the 
order of 30-40%.xix Possible behavioral responses (such as tax 
evasion) and statistical distortions make it impossible to determine 
the real reduction of income inequality. Moreover, it makes a 
difference whether the effect of tax measures is analyzed statically or 
dynamically. In the period 1990-1994, for instance, a package of 
measures was taken that affected the lower income brackets more 
favorably than the higher income groups. A dynamic analysis, 
however, leads to the conclusion that a large part of the reduction of 
the burden for the lower income brackets has faded away as a result 
of the increased micro progression factor.xx 
 
 Income transfers in cash are a second instrument of 
redistribution policy. The redistributive effect of all income transfers 
was very large in 1977: 46% measured by both the Gini-coefficient 
and the variation-coefficient, 73% according to the Theil-coefficient, 
and 92% measured by the ratio of income shares of the tenth and 
third deciles.xxi In 1981, the equalizing effect by income transfers 
was even greater,xxii but in 1991 it was somewhat smaller than in 
1977.xxiii The latter development suits the greater emphasis policy 
makers have laid on the allocative function of income differentials. 
Generally, the income redistribution can primarily be contributed to 
social benefits and to a smaller extent to the income tax and social 
security premiums. Moreover, the redistribution of incomes 
primarily occurs at the upper and lower tails of the income 
distribution. 
 
 The policy of adjusting social benefits to the development of 
wages appears to have been changing. In 1957, when the public 
pension system was enacted, the old age benefits were pegged to the 
wage index. This mechanism served as a model for other benefits. 
However, an automatic adjustment mechanism of social benefits to 
wage developments as laid down in 1980 in the Act Adjustment 
Mechanism Minimum Wage and Social Benefits appeared to raise so 
many problems, that the act has hardly been applied. Temporary 
measures ad hoc led to a practice that strongly deviated from the 
legal arrangement. In 1992, therefore, the automatic linking 
mechanism was replaced with a politically determined adjustment, 
enabling the government to link on more accurately to the economic 
development. 
 
 
 TABLE 3 
 Average Burden of Payroll Taxes, General 
 Social Security Contributions, and Income Tax 
 for Single Earners with Children as a Percentage 
 of Gross Income (Exclusive of Pension Premiums), 1994  
 
Gross Payroll General social Income Total  
incomea   taxes    security    tax burden 
   contributions    
 
Minimum 8.1 9.8 4.3  22.2 
Standard 10.7 12.0 5.3 28.0 
2x Standard 11.2 5.1 23.8 40.1 
4x Standard 5.6 2.6 40.1 48.3  
 
a. In 1994, the minimum income amounted to over NLG 28,000 
(approximately $14,000), while the standard income amounted to 
nearly NLG 49,000 (approximately $24,500).  
 
Source: Calculated on the basis of Ministry of Finance. 
Bouwstenennotitie, Ministry of Finance, The Hague, 1994, Part II, 
Annex 1 (Table 3).  
 
 
 
  A third instrument of redistribution policy are income 
transfers in kind, comprising both transfers from the government 
(such as rent subsidies) and transfers to the government (indirect 
taxes). In the Netherlands, income transfers in kind appear to affect 
the income distribution only to a small extent. The redistributive 
effect of the in-kind-transfers amounts to 3% of the initial income 
inequality, while the corresponding figure as to the indirect taxes 
amounts to 2%. Yet, they bring about considerable shifts in the 
income distribution. Approximately 30% of the households move at 
least one decile down and approximately 20% move at least one 
decile up under the influence of income transfers in kind. xxiv 
 
 The government provides certain goods and services free or for 
a lower price than its cost. Also, the government provides price 
subsidies for certain goods and services delivered by third parties. In 
a number of cases the government avails itself of income related 
subsidies or income prices. As a result, the price of the provision 
under consideration increases according to the user' s income until a 
certain limit. The cumulative effects of these arrangements may pose 
a problem in that they may result in extremely high overall marginal 
rates. However, practice shows that in the Netherlands there are 
virtually no households with an overall marginal rate of over 
100%.xxv One per cent of the households face an overall marginal 
rate of 80-100% and 12% face a rate of 60-80%. Though income 
prices and the resulting extreme overall marginal rates may disturb 
the labor market, it appears that this does not occur at a large scale.  
 
 
 
 
 
 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 Until the mid-1970s Dutch economic policy making was 
dominated by the keynesian line of thought. When the economic 
climate began to change in the 1960s, interest emerged in structural 
concepts such as production capacity. The Central Planning 
Bureauxxvi developed models that explicitly paid attention to the 
supply side of the economic process.xxvii Since then, the essence of 
the neoclassical line of thought can be found in the models used by 
the Central Planning Bureau and, consequently, in the process of 
policy making. However, society was not yet ready to adopt this 
change in policy view. Societal acceptance was delayed until the 
early 1980s.xxviii 
 
 Retrospectively, the cabinet-Den Uyl (1973-1977) seems to 
have been a transition cabinet. Starting as a keynesian oriented 
cabinet, it attempted to cope with the diminishing economic growth 
by expanding the public sector, resulting in an increasing budget 
deficit and a rising tax burden. However, during its term non-
keynesian insights began to influence policy makers, while the break 
in policy makers'  line of thinking was completed during the cabinet-
Van Agt I (1977-1981). This cabinet explicitly gave up keynesian 
oriented politico-economic concepts. As a result, concepts such as 
` overspending'  and ` cyclical injections'  were replaced with concepts 
such as ` real wage cost moderation'  and ` production cost' .  
 
 The policy of the cabinet-Van Agt I is consistent with the views 
and insights emerging in the mid-1970s. Though in practice the 
cabinet' s policy appears to have been a paper tiger, xxix the 
government gradually adjusted the institutional framework to its 
changed paradigm by abandoning a number of policy instruments 
that may be used to affect wages and other incomes. After the 
adoption of the (neoclassical) vintage approach the government paid 
more attention to the development of the share of labor in the value 
added produced in the private sector. However, it has never 
explicitly formulated a policy goal in terms of labor' s share, which 
contrasts with the first two stages of the post-war wage policy (1945-
1958). 
 
 Policy documents fail to make clear which theoretical approach 
with regard to the personal income distribution has been adopted. 
The papers show that the government confines itself to descriptions 
of the existing income distribution or to qualitative judgments of 
income differentials. Moreover, the rather vague goal of an 
` acceptable'  income distribution has never been formulated in 
concrete and quantitative terms, for example in terms of the 
reduction of a certain inequality measure. Because of the absence of 
a clear and concrete goal, a judgment of the policy with regard to 
the income distribution must be limited to the observation of this 
absence. 
 
 An interventionist government which intensively interferes with 
the economic process suits the keynesian line of thought. 
Government intervention seems a logical consequence of the role of 
government within this theoretical framework. The neoclassical 
equilibrium concept, however, stresses the market mechanism and 
leaves little room for government intervention in the economic 
process. A non-interventionist government better suits the 
neoclassical framework. Against this background of an altering 
theoretical framework of policy making it is explicable that in the 
1980s the government gave up a number of policy instruments 
designed to influence wages and other incomes. 
 
 The change of the theoretical framework of policy making 
appears to be coupled to more emphasis on the allocative function of 
income differentials. The income sources, with education being one 
of the most important, are highly relevant in this context. The 
development of the wage ratio between the higher and the lower 
educated seems consistent with the transformation of the theoretical 
framework of policy making. The wage ratio of all age categories 
decreased between 1962 and 1972, which is consistent with the 
egalitarian ideology prevailing in the 1960s and 1970s. Inconsistent 
with this ideology, however, is that the equalization of incomes of 
the 1960s has largely been undone for large groups in the 1970s. 
Moreover, wages of workers younger than 45 years seem to have 
been re-equalized in the 1980s, which is inconsistent with the 
ideological change that occurred in this period. Increasing income 
inequality, however, can be observed in other categories of workers, 
which better suits the ideology of a retreating government in the 
1980s and the prevailing policy view emphasizing the allocative 
function of income differentials. 
  Also consistent with the changed theoretical framework is the 
aloof attitude of the government with respect to wage formation. The 
government' s authority to interfere in wage formation was severely 
limited by the amendment of the Act on Wage Formation of 1986, 
while a ` normalization'  of labor relations has emerged in the public 
sector. The price/incomes policy with regard to the professions has 
merely led to a temporary change of the economic system - from the 
early 1970s until the early 1990s - and has brought about only small 
effects. Other measures than a direct incomes or price policy seem 
more effective in the long run, such as an increase of the number of 
public notaries. This links on to the greater emphasis that policy 
makers put on the market principle. The rise and fall of the 
price/incomes policy for the professions seem to mirror the changed 
theoretical framework of the economic policy making, i.e., the 
gradual replacement of the ideology of an interventionist government 
in the 1970s with the ideology of a retreating government in the 
1980s and 1990s. 
 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 The changed theoretical framework of policy making has 
affected the Dutch government' s policies profoundly. As to the 
income distribution policy the move from an interventionist to a 
retreating government finds expression in the scrapping by 
government of a number of policy instruments to influence the 
income distribution and an ever less detailed government 
interference with the income distribution. In this respect, however, 
the instrument of tax expenditures seems to be an exception in the 
1990s. This instrument has more intensively been used since the 
early 1990s,xxx but its effects on the income distribution are not yet 
clear. 
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